Here is a question a single offensive stat almost never answers: was that play called from a position of strength or a position of panic? Third-and-2 and third-and-12 are both "third down," but they are different sports. On one, an offense can do anything it wants; on the other, the whole stadium knows a pass is coming, and so does the defense. Bill Connelly's framework draws that line explicitly, splitting every snap into standard downs and passing downs — and once you do, efficiency numbers that looked flat suddenly tell two very different stories.

The one-sentence version: standard downs are the snaps where an offense can credibly run or pass; passing downs are the obvious-pass situations where it has lost that freedom — and a team's success in each measures two distinct skills.

The split: down and distance, sorted into two buckets

The classification is a function of down and distance. The conventional cutoffs, used across the analytics world:

  • Standard downs: 1st down (any distance), 2nd-and-7-or-less, and 3rd/4th-and-4-or-less. These are the downs where a run is still a real threat.
  • Passing downs: 2nd-and-8-or-more, and 3rd/4th-and-5-or-more. These are the downs where the offense is behind schedule and almost has to throw.

The exact yard thresholds vary a little between models, but the idea never changes: a standard down is one where the defense must respect both run and pass, and a passing down is one where it doesn't. That single distinction reshapes the chess match. On standard downs a defense plays honest, balancing its front and coverage; on passing downs it can tee off — nickel and dime packages, pass rushers pinning their ears back, coverages built to take away the throw. The offense, in turn, calls plays differently in each world. So measuring efficiency without separating them is like averaging your highway and city fuel economy and calling it one number.

Why one success rate isn't enough

Recall how we score a play as a success: it has to gain enough to stay ahead of the chains — the 50/70/100 rule from our success rate and EPA explainer (50% of the distance on 1st down, 70% on 2nd, 100% on 3rd or 4th). Standard-downs success rate is that calculation run only on standard-down snaps; passing-downs success rate is the same calculation on passing-down snaps. Two numbers, two skills:

  • Standard-downs success rate measures whether an offense wins when it holds the advantage — whether it can stay on schedule and avoid digging holes in the first place. This is where most plays live, and it correlates most strongly with simply being a sound, balanced offense.
  • Passing-downs success rate measures whether an offense can dig out of holes — convert third-and-long, escape obvious-pass downs the defense has loaded up to stop. It leans heavily on quarterback play, protection, and explosive-pass ability, and it is far more volatile from week to week.

A team can be excellent at one and poor at the other, and the combination is diagnostic. An offense that thrives on standard downs but stalls on passing downs is a stay-on-schedule team: dangerous when ahead of the chains, sunk when it falls behind. The reverse — mediocre on standard downs, lethal on passing downs — describes a boom-or-bust offense that bails itself out with a star quarterback and chunk plays but lives dangerously. Blend the two into one success rate and you erase exactly the contrast that explains how a team wins or loses.

An illustrative example

Consider two hypothetical offenses with the same overall success rate. The numbers below are invented to show the split, not measured from any real team:

Illustrative (made-up) example: two offenses with identical overall success rate but opposite situational profiles. Figures are hypothetical, chosen to show the standard-down / passing-down contrast.
OffenseOverall success rateStandard-downs SRPassing-downs SR
On-schedule team45%52%25%
Bail-out team45%42%38%

Same headline number, two different football teams. The on-schedule team rarely beats itself early but is in trouble the moment it faces third-and-long; it needs to script clean first and second downs to survive. The bail-out team gives up more standard-down stops — more first-down stuffs, more second-and-longs — but it converts an unusually high share of passing downs, the mark of a quarterback who can win obvious-pass reps. Defensively, you'd attack them in opposite ways: load up to stop the on-schedule team's standard-down run game, but get the bail-out team behind schedule and trust your pass rush. A single success rate sees neither plan. (Again, these figures are made up to illustrate the idea.)

Staying "on schedule" is itself a skill

There's a subtler point buried in the split: the best offenses don't just play passing downs well — they avoid them. Every snap that stays on standard downs is a snap the offense gets to keep its full menu and the defense has to stay honest. Falling into a passing down hands the defense its preferred matchup. So a quietly elite trait is a low rate of passing downs in the first place — staying ahead of the chains so that third-and-long rarely arrives.

This connects the framework directly to expected points added. EPA assigns every play a point value based on down, distance, and field position, and the penalty for falling behind schedule is exactly what EPA captures: a 2-yard gain on 1st-and-10 barely dents the situation, but it sets up a 2nd-and-8 — a passing down — and the expected-points value of the next snap drops accordingly. Negative-EPA standard-down plays are how offenses dig the holes that passing-downs success rate then has to climb out of. Efficient teams keep the down-and-distance ladder short; inefficient ones keep falling to the bottom rung and asking their quarterback to leap back up.

Where explosiveness fits

Success rate is only half of any situational picture; the other half is explosiveness — how big the gains are when they happen, the subject of our explosiveness and yards-per-play explainer. And explosiveness, like efficiency, behaves differently by situation. Standard-down explosiveness often comes from the run game and play-action against an honest defense; passing-down explosiveness comes from beating a defense that's selling out to stop the pass, which is harder but, when it lands, can flip a near-certain punt into a chunk gain. The cleanest read on an offense uses all four cells: standard-downs efficiency and explosiveness, passing-downs efficiency and explosiveness. That two-by-two is most of what a good advanced box score is trying to tell you.

Author to-do: the current standard-downs and passing-downs success-rate leaders (opponent-adjusted, offense and defense) come from scripts/standard-downs-passing-downs.py, which pulls live play-by-play from the CollegeFootballData API and classifies each snap by down and distance. Run it to drop this season's situational leaderboards in here. (Per site policy, I'd rather show this note than invent numbers.)

How to use the split

  • Diagnose, don't just rank. A middling overall success rate can hide an elite standard-down offense with a passing-down problem — a fixable one, often a protection or third-down play-calling issue. The split tells you where a team is breaking.
  • Trust standard downs more, sooner. Standard-down numbers stabilize faster because that's where most snaps are; passing-down rates swing on a small sample and a few big plays, so they're noisy early in a season.
  • Read the defense the same way. A defense that's stout on standard downs but leaky on passing downs can't get off the field on third-and-long — a very different fix from one that gives up easy early-down yards.
  • Don't forget garbage time and opponent. The same caveats that haunt every efficiency stat apply here: a passing-down conversion against a soft prevent defense, up four scores, shouldn't count like one in a tie game, and big situational splits against a weak schedule deserve a strength-of-schedule discount.

The next time a team is described as "good on third down," ask the question the phrase hides: third-and-short, or third-and-long? Standard down, or passing down? Those are two different teams playing two different games — and the offenses that win the most are usually the ones that make sure the second game comes up as rarely as possible.

Sources & further reading

The CollegeAthleteInsider Analyst

I'm an independent analyst covering college football and basketball through public data. Every number here traces to a script in /scripts. More about the methodology →